Opoku-Afari: IMF programmes unable to address political economy roots of debt accumulation

This include electoral competition and patronage-related spending pressures where rollover and liquidity risks were at times underweighted; stress-testing of domestic debt and its interaction with the banking system was limited; coverage of the wider public-sector balance sheet (including SOEs [State-Owned Enterprises], guarantees, and other contingent liabilities) remained incomplete; and the sovereign–bank “doom loop” was not always assessed in a comprehensive, integrated manner.

Third, IMF-supported programme design often prioritized near-term consolidation over reforms that address the structural drivers of recurrent debt accumulation—particularly in energy pricing, SOE governance, and tax policy and administration.

Second, the analysis did not fully internalise domestic-debt dynamics and fiscal–financial feedback effects, leading to an under-appreciation of rollover, liquidity, and banking-sector channels.